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A

the United Nations has promulgated a set of principles
and rules concerning the applicability of International Humanitarian
Law (IHL) to military forces under its command and control. l
From the time that the first United Nations force was put into the
field-that is, into the Sinai2-and especially the first one that was required to
engage in active military operations-in the Congo3-the question has been
raised to what extent are or should such operations be subjected to IHL. This
question became more urgent as the number and extent of UN military opera'
tions suddenly increased in the 1990s-following the uniquely successful oper,
ation in Namibia. 4 As described below, the answer to what would seem to be a
relatively simple question with an obvious answer (they should be!) has not
been easy to arrive at. The present study is not intended as a contribution to
the academic debate,S but rather catalogues the practical arrangements that
have been made, or neglected, in this regard. Meanwhile, other essentially neg,
ative developments such as the increasingly frequent assaults on UN forces and
the brutality of many recent conflicts, have raised some related problems. The
protection of UN forces, their responsibilities when faced with major violations
of IHL, and their interaction with the international criminal tribunals estab,
lished in the past several years will also be discussed briefly herein.
T LONG LAST,
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UN Forces and International Humanitarian Law
Background
Blue Helmet6 operations come in many different shapes, sizes, and complex,
ities, and in particular have various and sometimes varying or evolving man'
dates. Although a few have been established by the UN General Assembly,7
the great bulk were created by the Security Council. In doing so, the Council
acted under two different sources of authority located somewhere in the UN
Charter. The larger number, the so,called peace,keeping operations, are au,
thorized under what Secretary,General Hammarskjold characterized as Chapter VIYz, thus indicating that there was no specific Charter authority that could
be cited. 8 The remaining operations are authorized, or sometimes continued,9
under Chapter VII, which in its Article 42 does foresee the Council deploying
air, sea or land forces. lO
There are yet other types of UN-authorized deployments of military forces,
which are sometimes confused with the Blue Helmet operations mentioned
above. The exemplars of the first of these types are the coalition forces that
fought the Korean War in the 1950's and the Gulf War in 1991. Though both
were specifically authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, and
therefore considered by the public to be UN operations,11 they in effect consisted of alliances, both of which were organized and led by the United States.
Their status under the Charter was somewhat unclear; on the one hand, they
could be considered as forces the Security Council "deployed" under Article
42, though the Council retained almost no power over the organization of the
forces and their actual operations; they could also be considered as merely col,
lective self,defense operations authorized by the Council under Article 51; finally, they could be considered as simply falling under Chapter VII in
general-as is the case, for example, with the establishment of the two War
Crimes T ribunals 12 under that Chapter without any specific article to rely on. 13
The other type of non-UN operations are those that the Security Council "uti,
lizes" under Article 53.1 of Chapter VIII {"Regional Arrangements"). 14 Both
types can be characterized as examples of the Security Council "franchising"
military operations to an ad hoc coalition or a regional organization. In any
event, in view of the minimal influence the Security Council has so far exercised
over the actual conduct of these types of operations 15-which is not to say that
the Council could not, and perhaps should actually, exercise much stricter direction and supervision, as these operations could not legally take place without the
Council's authorization-they will only be considered en passant in this study.
Reverting now to UN Blue Helmet operations, what are their main charac,
teristics? The execution of each of these operations or forces is delegated by the
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establishing organ, normally the Security Council but sometimes the General
Assembly, to the Secretary,General, who thus acts, in a sense (though the term
is never used), as Commander,in,Chief. To the extent that any aspect of such
operations is not specified by the establishing organ-and typically this is true
of most aspects except for the basic mandate and the force strength-these de'
terminations must be made by the Secretary,General or under his authority.
He himself delegates this authority in several ways: (i) to the Un,
der,Secretary,General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO); (ii) for some operations also to a Personal or Special Representative,
who is a high, ranking staff member; (iii) and, for each operation, to a Force
Commander. The latter is a military officer seconded by a member State to the
United Nations and thus employed by the latter as a staff member; he is there,
fore fully under the authority of the Secretary,General, and not under that of
his government. 16 The force, itself, is made up of military personnel supplied
(made available) by member States to the United Nations, normally in the
form of a distinct unit (e.g., a platoon, company, battalion) with its own cadre
of commissioned and non,commissioned officers. They perform their functions
as ordered by the Force Commander, but their internal discipline is maintained
according to their national regulations. In particular, the punishment of any vi,
olations takes place under national authority and not that of the United Na,
tions.l7 These troops keep their national uniforms, but typically wear a blue
helmet (hence their name) or beret and some shoulder insignia indicating that
they constitute part of a UN force. They are also remunerated by and according
to the rules of their country, though the UN provides them with a per diem and
reimburses their governments for its outlays according to a uniform scale estab,
lished by the General Assembly.
Thus, except for the Force Commander, the military component of a UN
force (there may also be police and civilian components) consists of national
contingents (military units or, rarely, individuals) voluntarily provided by
member States, 18 operating under general UN command as to their operations
but still under national authority as to their behavior. This also means that to
the extent such units and persons are required by international and/or national
law to abide by IHL, in whole or in part, these troops continue to operate under
such constraints even while under UN command. 19 Whether these constraints
could be loosened by the competent UN organs should they so direct is ex,
plored briefly below.
Though this has so far been the invariable practice in composing UN
forces,20 it should be noted that this is not the sole possible model. In principle,
the United Nations could recruit military personnel directly (or by
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secondment-as is the situation of the Force Commanders) and employ them
as UN staff 21 to constitute a standing UN force. Currently, this is precluded by
political and financial considerations, and therefore will not be further consid,
ered in this study. It should, however, be noted that Article 3A of the Institute
ofInternational Law's Zagreb Resolution 22 specifically foresees and deals with
this possibility.
Finally, it should be noted that various UN forces have many different man,
dates. One can distinguish between peace,keeping (the maintenance of a
"peace" or at least an agreed cease,fire), peace,making (the imposition by force
of a cease,fire on warring entities, whether these be those of different countries
or of governmental and irregular forces within a country), peace,building (the
reconstruction of a peaceful society in place of a previous war,torn one) 23 and,
perhaps, solely humanitarian tasks (those merely assisting other UN opera,
tions, such as UNHCR or UNICEF, or humanitarian NGOs in delivering and
distributing food, medicine, and other humanitarian aid). A force may be ere,
ated with a particular mandate and later have others imposed on it by the es,
tablishing organ. Though normally one distinguishes between Chapter VIYz
and Chapter VII mandates, in practice this distinction may tum out to be
rather artificial,24 the important factor being the amount of force that is actu'
ally required by and available to the components of the operation to carry out
their assignment. 25
Thus, it is problematic to try to distinguish the status under IHL of a particu,
lar UN military operation, whether based on its name, its initial or even its cur,
rent mandate, or its establishment under different provisions of the UN
Charter. Similarly, in light of how the conflict in Yugoslavia changed from an
internal one within the SFRY to an international one as various constituent
Republics gained de facto and later recognized de jure independence, and to
some extent the similar developments within Bosnia itself, any conclusions as
to the status or responsibilities of a UN force under IHL depending on whether
a conflict is a civil or an international one is likely to lead to confusion and un,
certainty.26 Probably the only useful criterion is whether or not a force is actu,
ally engaged in combatP
Application of IHL to UN Forces
Multilateral Treaties

The United Nations is not a party to any of the multilateral treaties in which
the principles and rules of IHL are expressed. Although for some time the
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ICRC pressed the organization to become a party to the 1949 Geneva Conven~
tions, especially to Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per~
sons in Time of War, 28 the United Nations raised two basic objections: 29 (i)
although intergovernmental organizations can become parties to treaties with
States,30 including multilateral ones, the 1949 Geneva Conventions were only
designed, as appears from their final clauses, for participation by States; and (ii)
numerous provisions, especially of Convention IV, could only apply to States,
which can exercise full governmental functions, such as the arrest, prosecu~
tion, trial and imprisonment of offenders against the Convention-which the
United Nations is not equipped to do}1 Moreover, it was considered somewhat
unseemly to suggest that the United Nations might be "a party" to a military
conflict. Finally, the United Nations has pointed out that all the States that
contribute military units to a UN operation are in any event bound by the prin~
cipal IHL treaties, as well as by customary IHL, and the obligations of these
units thereunder are not diminished by the fact that they are in UN service.
Using similar arguments, the United Nations also resisted making any gen~
eral declaration of acceptance of any or all such treaties. When it was suggested
that the organization might in such a declaration indicate that its acceptance
does not apply to parts of the treaties that are inapplicable to anyone except a
sovereign State, the UN objected that such a selective acceptance might actu~ ,
ally endanger or weaken the integrity of the instruments in question. Instead, it
had (as recalled below) in many instances undertaken to observe the "princi~
pIes and spirit," or more lately the "principles and rules," of these conventions}2 Outside observers considered this formulation inadequate, preferring
instead an undertaking to apply the instruments "mutatis mutandis." The orga~
nization was unwilling to go that far}3
There have been a few instances in which the United Nations has, in effect,
acted as at least a temporary territorial sovereign, but fortunately in these in~
stances no combat of any sort took place that would have raised obligations un~
der IHL. The first of these situations arose when the organization facilitated
the transfer of West New Guinea from The Netherlands to Indonesia (October
1962 to April 1963), for which purpose it established the United Nations Secu~
rity Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNSF)}4 In the case of Namibia,
although the General Assembly had invalidated South Africa's League ofNa~
tions mandate over South~West Africa (Namibia), the actual arrangements by
the Security Council for the establishment of the United Nations Transition
Assistance Group (UNTAG)35 were such that the Council accepted the con~
tinuation of de facto South African control over the territory, to be exercised
under UNTAG supervision until the attainment of independence-thus no
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question of the UN exercising sovereign authority arose. Although the estab,
lishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II)36 was
on the basis that no effective government existed for the country, the mandates
assigned to UNOSOM did not contemplate it exercising genuine governmen,
tal authority. As part of the resolution of the Croatia/Serbia conflict, the
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Sirmium (UNTAES) administered the indicated areas in Croatia
(formerly the Eastern Slavonia UNPA) from 1996 to 1998.3 7 In 1999 the
United Nations established "an international civil presence in Kosovo," in ef,
feet in a condominium with NATO, which is charged with establishing an "in'
ternational security presence" there,38 as well as the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which is "empowered
to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration
of justice."39
In spite of the UN's resistance to accepting the Geneva and other IHL trea,
ties by participation or a general declaration, the organization has, as discussed
below, recognized their binding nature in respect of particular operations, both
by means of the regulations issued for them and by the bilateral agreements
concluded with host States and with troop' contributing States.

International Customary Law
The United Nations has never denied that its military operations are subject
to customary IHL or that the substance of most of the significant IHL treaties has
passed into customary law. Although questions might surface about the custom,
ary law character of those parts of the Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Con'
ventions that had not already had that character before their adoption, such
doubts do not appear to have been raised by the United Nations itself.
In the mid,1960s (evidently in wake of the Congo operation)39 a number of
semi, official suggestions were made for the United Nations to accept explicitly
the applicability ofIHL to its forces. These included resolutions adopted at the
20th International Conference of the Red Cross40 and at the 52nd Conference
of the International Law Association (ILA).41 After studying this question
from 1965, the private but highly respected Institute ofInternational Law at its
55th session, held in Zagreb in 1971, adopted a resolution on "Conditions of
the Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in
which United Nations Forces May Be Engaged,"42 of which Article 2 reads as
follows:
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The humanitarian rules oflaw of armed conflict apply to the United Nations as of
right, and they must be complied with in all circumstances by United Nations
Forces which are engaged in hostilities.
The rules referred to in the preceding paragraph include in particular:
(a) the rules pertaining to the conduct of hostilities in general and especially
those prohibiting the use or some uses of certain weapons, those concerning
the means of injuring the other party, and those relating to the distinction
between military and non-military objectives;
(b) the rules contained in the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949;
(c) the rules which aim at protecting civilian personnel and property.

It might also be noted that the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United
Nations and Associated Personnel, which was adopted by the General Assembly, explicitly excludes from its coverage "a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations ... to which the law of international armed
conflict applies."43 This implies that the Assembly appeared to consider that
IHL applies to at least some Chapter VII operations.

Powers of the Security Council
The question might be asked whether the General Assembly or the Security
Council could exempt the United Nations and its forces from any of the provisions of IHL.
As to the General Assembly, the answer would appear to be negative, for all
it may do under Charter Articles 10 and 11 is make recommendations to member States. The Security Council can, of course, make decisions that are binding on members by Charter Article 25 and, for decisions made by the Council
under Chapter VII, also by Article 48.1. This, then, brings Charter Article 103
into play, under which in case of conflict between the obligations of a member
under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, the former-and these certainly include binding decisions of the Council-prevail. Thus, it would seem that the Council could supersede merely
treaty-based IHL obligations.
Whether and to what extent Article 103 also applies to international customary law is not clear from the wording of that provision, though in general it
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would seem that it should apply at least by analogy. This, however, would prob:
ably not be true of any principles oflHL that are jus cogeru,44 as many commen,
tators have asserted in general or with reference to particular rules. The
difficulty is that, in the absence of any authoritative determination of what, if
any, IHL principles have attained that unassailable status,45 any limits on the
powers of the Security Council in this regard are vague.
It should be noted that this discussion is entirely theoretical, for, so far, the
Security Council has in no instance given any instruction to a UN operation, or
authorization to a franchised one, that explicitly or implicitly contravened any
IHL principle.46
The Practice of the United Nations Relating
to the Applicability of nIL to Its Military Forces
Past and Recent Practice
Particular Regulations. The Regulations issued by the Secretary,General
for the conduct of the early peace,keeping operations of the United Nations,
i.e., UNEF 1,47 ONUC,48 and UNFICYP,49 contained the following provision:
The Force shall observe the principles and spirit of the general international
Conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel. (Emphasis added.)

In a February 21, 1966, exchange of letters between the Secretary,General
and the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the for,
mer clarified this provision of the UNFICYP Regulations as follows:
11. The international Conventions referred to in this Regulation include, inter
alia, the Geneva (Red Cross) Conventions of 12 August 1949 [United Nations,
Treaty Series, Vol. 75, pp. 31, 85,135, and 287]50 to which your Government is a
party and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at the Hague on 14 May 1954 [United
Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 249, p. 215].51 In this connexioh, and particularly
with respect to the humanitarian provisions of these Conventions, it is requested
that the Governments of the participating States ensure that the members of
their contingents serving with the Force be fully acquainted with the obligations
arising under these Conventions and that appropriate steps be taken to ensure
their enforcement."52 (The original footnotes are reproduced within the
brackets.)
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However, such regulations have not been issued for later UN forces or oper,
ations, and thus, until the just,issued Secretary,General's Bulletin,53 there
were no explicit instructions to them in respect ofIHL. However, as discussed
below, for some time now pertinent provisions have been included in both
SOFAs and the agreements with troop-contributing countries.
Status,of,Forces Agreements. Normally, whenever possible, the Secretary,
General concludes a Status,of,Forces Agreement (SOFA) with each country
in which a UN force is to operate, specifying in considerable detail the respec,
tive rights and obligations of the parties, particularly those regarding privileges
and immunities. Inter alia, SOFAs exempt-the members of the force from the
criminal jurisdiction of the host State, leaving it for their national States to im,
pose any disciplinary or criminal penalties in respect of at least the military
members of the force, while providing for the possibility of the Secretary,
General waiving the immunity of civilian members (e.g., UN staff).
Although no provision relating to IHL appeared in the Model SOFA com'
municated by the Secretary,General to the General Assembly in 1990,54 in re,
cent years the following provision has been included in these instruments:
Without prejudice to the mandate of [acronym for the force-hereafter UNX]
and its international status:
(a) the United Nations shall ensure that UNX shall conduct its operations in
[host State] with full respect for the principles and spirit of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel. These international conventions include the four Geneva Conventions of i2 August 1949 and their
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the UNESCO Convention of 14 May
1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
(b) the Government undertakes to treat at all times the military personnel ofUNX
with full respect for the principles and spirit of the general international conven,
tions applicable to the treatment of military personnel. These international con,
ventions include the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.

UNX and the Government shall therefore ensure that members of their
respective military personnel are fully acquainted with the principles and spirit of
the above-mentioned international instruments.55

Section 3 of the Secretary,General's Bulletin provides that in SOFAs the
United Nations will ensure that its forces fully respect "the general conventions
applicable to the conduct of military personnel" and that its forces be fully
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acquainted with these principles and rules. It is further stated that the same obligations are to apply even in the absence of a SOFA.
Agreements with Troop-Contributing States. The Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and
Equipment to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations contains the following
standard clause:
ApPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

28. [The United Nations peace-keeping operation] shall observe and respect the
principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the
conduct of military personnel. The international conventions referred to above
include the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the
Protection of Cultural Property in the event of anned conflict. [The Participating
State] shall therefore ensure that the members of its national contingent serving
with the [United Nations peace-keeping operation] be fully acquainted with the
ptinciples and spirit of these Conventions."56

In practice, however, formal agreements along these lines are only rarely
concluded with troop-contributing States.57 Presumably, were the Organization to insist on the conclusion of such agreements, it might find it even more
difficult to secure sufficient contingents for its several operations.
On October 29, 1998, Bernard Miyet, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, announced to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly that
troop-contributing States would be asked not to send civilian police or military
observers younger than 25, and that troops in national contingents should preferably be 21 but no less than 18.58 Aside from promoting thereby the principle
that children under 18 should not participate in military forces, the minimum
ages specified should help ensure that UN forces are constituted of persons mature enough to observe IHL.
On August 25, 1999, the Security Council adopted a resolution on children in
armed conflict, which inter alia requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the
personnel involved in UN peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activities "have appropriate training on the protection, rights and welfare of children."59
General Regulation

Development. Already many years ago it was suggested, in particular by the
ICRC, that the United Nations should issue a general regulation {or
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incorporate a section in a general directive concerning the governance of UN
military forces} setting out somewhat more detailed provisions concerning the
observance of IHL, which would supplement the rather anodyne clauses re~
cited above. The General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Op~
erations in April 1995 called on the Secretary~General "to complete the
elaboration of a code of conduct for United Nations peace~keeping personnel,
consistent with applicable international humanitarian law, so as to ensure the
highest standards of performance and conduct."6o
In June 1994 the ICRC arranged a Symposium on Humanitarian Action
and Peace~keeping Operations, and as a follow~up it convened in March and
October 1995 brief meetings of experts "to draw up a list of rules of inter~
national humanitarian law which were applicable to peace~keeping and peace~
enforcement operations and which should be taught in training programmes
for all troops supplied to the United Nations."61 The ICRC's experts designed a
relatively short list of rules excerpted from the basic instruments ofIHL, going
back as far as the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration62 but relying most heavily on
the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
This draft was conveyed to the Secretary~General and was considered
within the Secretariat for a number of years. This lengthy dwell time resulted
from several factors, including the diminished urgency due to the recent reduc~
tion in the number of UN operations in which military personnel are used for
any except rather modest protective functions. In this context, the extensive
references to combat operations and their consequences, such as the taking of
prisoners and the custody of enemy wounded, and the need to protect civilians
both in combat and in occupied territory, seemed to give a misleading impres~
sion of the scope and nature of UN military operations, especially the current
ones. One can also imagine that at least some of the troop~contributing States
would have expressed unease concerning the use of extracts from carefully ne~
gotiated treaties, in which particular rules are separated from the precisely
worded restrictions and limitations in which they were originally embedded,
and the heavy reliance on Protocol I, which has not yet gained the adherence
of many of the principal troop contributors (though the particular provisions
relied on are presumably not the ones these States find objectionable in the
Protocol). Thus, it could not have been easy to find a middle ground between,
on the one hand, the former general references to the principal conventions
and, on the other, an unconditional acceptance of these instruments, by pick~
ing and choosing as especially binding only the most significant provisions.
Although the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Op~
erations, while continuing to urge the completion of this project, also expressed

517

UN Forces and International Humanitarian Law
the view that it itself be consulted thereon,63 the Secretary,General ultimately
held no formal consultations with the Committee or with any other intergov,
ernmental body, but rather informally circulated a draft of the Bulletin to mem,
bers of the Committee and took into account certain of their suggestions. The
Bulletin,64 whose substantive provisions apparently depart only slightly from
the 1995 ICRC experts' draft, was promulgated by the Secretary,General on
August 6, 1999, on his own authority.
Provisions. The Secretary,General's Bulletin consists of an introductory
paragraph followed by ten Sections, many divided into several paragraphs. Sec,
tions 1-4 and 10 deal with essentially formal matters, while Sections 5-9 set
out the substantive provisions.
Section 1, on "Field of application," specifies in paragraph 1.1 that the Bulle,
tin applies to those situations when UN forces are engaged in armed conflict,
whether in enforcement actions or as peace,keepers authorized to use force in
self,defence; paragraph 1.2 states that the promulgation of the Bulletin does
not affect the protection afforded to members of UN peacekeeping operations
by the 1994 Convention. 65 Section 2, "Application of national law," merely
states that the provisions of the Bulletin are not intended to constitute an
exhaustive catalogue ofIHL and that they are not intended to prejudice the
full application of IHL, as well as of applicable national laws, to national
contingents. The provisions of Section 3, "Status,of,forces agreement," were
discussed above. 66 Section 4, "Violations ofinternational humanitarian law," re,
affirms that such violations are to be prosecuted in national courts67-though,
presumably, this would not exclude the jurisdiction of the nascent Inter,
national Criminal Court or of either of the existing War Crimes Tribunals
(ICTY and ICTR) in applicable cases. Section 10, "Entry into force," estab,
lishes that date as August 12, 1999, the 50th anniversary of the Geneva
Conventions.
The provisions of Section 5, "Protection of the civilian population," Section
6, "Means and methods of combat," Section 7 , "Treatment of civilians and per,
sons hors de c07!lbat," Section 8, "Treatment of detained persons," and Section
9, "Protection of the wounded, the sick, and medical and relief personnel," are
evidently adapted largely from the 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and especially from the 1977 Protocol I thereto. As the specific
sources are not indicated in the Bulletin, an attempt to do so has been made in
Appendix II, which indicates what the apparent principal source of each provi,
sion of the Bulletin is and what other parts of the codified IHL, and even some
other provisions of international law, appear relevant. From that table it ap,
pears that for the most part the paragraphs of Sections 5, 6 and 7 are precise
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paraphrases of the indicated provisions of Protocol I, and those in Section 9 of
Geneva Convention I, generally merely substituting "The United Nations
force" for "The Parties to the conflict" or for the impersonal passive mode. On
the other hand, the sub,paragraphs in Section 8 rely more indirectly on Geneva
Convention III.
Potential Questions. The Secretary,General issued his Bulletin on his own
authOrity, deriving from his positions as "chief administrative officer" of the
United Nations 68and de facto Commander,in,Chief of UN Blue Helmet
operations. In doing so, he was also responding to the 1995 call of the General
Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations69-though not to
its recent request that it be consulted in the process. 70
Incidentally, even though the Special Committee in this pronouncement re,
ferred to "guidelines," which suggests a non,binding set of norms, its 1995 re,
port had referred to a "code of conduct" and the actual Bulletin is drafted in
that sense. It should be noted that the operative verbs in Sections 5-9 are all
"shall," "shall not," "is prohibited," and similar expressions, thereby indicating
binding obligations or prohibitions. There is no doubt that as Com,
mander,in,Chief, the Secretary,General is authorized to express such com,
mands and that if any troop' contributing State should object to such rules, it
may not cause its troops to defy or disregard the Bulletin but can only withdraw
them from UN operations.
Although the Secretary,General had implicit authority to promulgate the
Bulletin, this is not the only way in which it could have been issued and given
legal force. Either the General Assembly or the Security Council could have
promulgated such a code and, indeed, if either should now do so, such code
would, at least as far as it specified, supersede that of the Secretary,Generai.
Equally, it would be possible for either the Assembly or the Council to nullify
the new Bulletin,71 but the Secretary,General must have calculated both that
this is most unlikely to happen and that the likelihood of either of those bodies
reaching an early agreement on any code of their own as also being minimal.
It is also clear that by its terms the Bulletin only applies to "United Nations
forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control."72
It thus does not purport to apply to operations merely authorized by the Secu,
rity Council (such as those described earlier). Nor could the Secretary,General
have issued any code or even guidelines in respect of such operations, which
are not under his command; at most he can suggest to the Council that some
such rules be issued. 73 Only the Security Council could, as a condition for au,
thorizing any military operation to be carried out by States or by regional orga,
nizations, whether under Charter Article 42,51, or 53, make it a condition that
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these be carried out in compliance with general or specific provisions of IHL,
such as those set out in the Bulletin, applied mutatis mutandis.
It should be noted that even though paragraph 1.2 of the Bulletin refers to
the 1994 "Safety" Convention, and that treaty refers to the applicability oflHL
to certain UN operations,74 these two instruments do not fit together
seamlessly. The Convention excludes from its coverage Chapter VII operations
"in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized
armed forces," while the Bulletin applies to all situations (that is, not only
Chapter VII operations or those in which the opponents are organized armed
forces) of armed conflict when UN forces are engaged therein as active com,
batants. Thus, there may be situations in which both the Bulletin and the Con,
vention would seem to apply (e.g., self,defensive combat in Chapter VIYz
operations, or Chapter VII ones against unorganized militias)-but there is no
reason to fear that this would lead to any practical difficulties.
As to the substantive provisions of the Bulletin, it might be remarked that in
a few respects these do not reflect the most recent developments-presumably
because they were based on a draft prepared by ICRC experts in 1995. One of
these is the failure to refer, in the recitation in the last sentence of paragraph
6.2, which is evidently based on the original three protocols to the 1980 Inhu,
mane Weapons Convention,75 to the blinding laser weapons prohibited by the
1995 Protocol IV to ·the ConventionJ6 Of course, it should not be difficult to
correct any oversights or to make other desired changes in the Bulletin, as the
Secretary,General can issue addenda, amendments or revisions at any time.
Special Protection of UN Forces
In considering the applicability ofIHL to UN forces, account should also be
taken of several recent treaties by which the States parties are to accord special
protection to these forces, as well as to other related UN operations and per'
sonnel and to those of other intergovernmental and even non,governmental
organizations. In this connection, it should be noted that the principal IHL
treaties, in particular 1949 Geneva Convention IV and 1977 Protocol I, do
contain provisions protecting humanitarian activities carried out by organiza,
tions of a non,military character,77 which might apply to UN operations such as
those ofUNHCR, UNICEF and the World Food Programme, but not to any
Blue Helmet force.
The first protective provision referring directly to UN forces appeared in the
1980 Mines ProtocoI78 to the 1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention,79 in
which Article 8, "Protection of United Nations forces and missions from the
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effects of minefields, mines and booby~traps," deals in paragraph 1 with "a
United Nations force or mission [that] performs functions of a peacekeeping,
observation or similar function" and in paragraph 2 with "a United Nations
fact~finding mission." This Protocol was considerably expanded and strength~
ened, also in respect of the above~mentioned provisions, by an amendment
adopted on May 3, 1996, at a Review Conference for the Convention.BO
On December 9, 1994, the General Assembly, in response to ever more fre~
quent attacks on United Nations peace~keeping and similar forces and opera~
tions and the significant toll these were taking in deaths and injuries, adopted
the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Auxiliary Personnel.B1 As
already pointed out, Article 2 of the Convention excludes its application to
Chapter VII operations. Paragraph 1.2 of the new Bulletin explicitly provides
that its promulgation does not "affect the protected status of members of peace~
keeping operations" under the Convention, "as long as they are entitled to the
protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict."
Finally, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal CourtB2 includes in
the definition of "war crimes" that are to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court:
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled
to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the intemationallaw
of armed conflict;

whether these take place in an "international armed conflict" or in an "armed
conflict not of an international character."B3 Here again, UN forces engaged in
actual combat operations would seem to be excluded-though it is not clear to
what extent this depends on their establishment under Charter Chapter VIYz
or VII.
Positive Obligations of UN Forces
In connection with some UN operations, especially those with very limited
mandates, the question has arisen to what extent their personnel are required
or even allowed to intervene in violations ofIHL that they can actually observe
or of which they are otherwise reliably informed.
UN forces are generally restricted to operating within their mandates; this is
especially true when these mandates, as in all Chapter VIYz situations, depend
on the consent of all parties to a conflict. Furthermore, the forces are in
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practical terms restricted by their small size and feeble armaments, which are
usually quite limited in Chapter VIYz and even in Chapter VII operations. The
conditions under which a given force may be allowed to use force in situations
other than strict self-defense, that is, in defense of other persons, may be covered in its rules of engagement; currently, consideration is being given to drafting a set of model rules of engagement for UN peace-keeping operations in
which instructions on this point might be included. The sentiment has been
expressed that UN forces should be given mandates, and presumably appropriate arms, to prevent violations ofIHL of which they become aware. 84
Finally it should be noted that whenever the United Nations is in de facto, and
especially if in de jure, control of any territory, then it may have a legal as well as a
moral obligation to prevent, as far as it is able, violations ofIHL in such territory.
Cooperation with International Tribunals
With the establishment by the Security Council of the two ad hoc War
Crimes Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia85 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,86 and the possible
creation of additional ones at least before the entry into force of the Statute of
the International Criminal Court, another set of problems has arisen for certain
UN forces and for related UN civilian operations-to what extent are these
forces and operations obliged to cooperate with tribunals, in particular by making available knowledgeable persons as witnesses, as well as relevant
documentation?
Liminally, it is possible to take two conceptually different approaches to
these questions. When a question arises as to cooperation between a Security
Council-established UN force and a Council-established tribunal, it could be
held that it is one that ultimately the Council must determine. Thus, if the Secretary-General, in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of a UN force, determines that certain cooperation demanded by a tribunal would be inimical to
some aspect of the operation 'of the force, he or the tribunal would refer this
conflict to the Council and secure its determination whether in a given instance (or a class ofinstances) one or the other of these subsidiary organs of the
Council should prevail.
Alternat~vely-and this is the approach that has actually been
adopted-the Secretary-General can, in light of the complete judicial independence of the tribunals, treat them essentially at arms length and apply by
analogy the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and
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Immunities of the United Nations, which in respect of the courts and other au,
thorities of States parties (but not of international tribunals) provides that:
Privileges and immunities are granted to [officials] [experts] in the interests of
the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals
themselves. The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive
the immunity of any [official] [expert] in any case where, in his opinion, the
immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without
prejudice to the interests of the United Nations. 87

Applying this principle to the military members of UN forces and to civilian
members of these and other UN operations, such persons are to be made avail,
able to a UN tribunal when this can be done without prejudice to the interests
of these forces and operations. In addition, the Secretary,General has decided
that it is also his duty to act equitably as between the tribunals' prosecutor and
the defendants, so that assistance rendered to one side (e.g., in interviewing
potential witnesses) must equally be rendered to the other. That is, the Secre,
tary-General will, in appropriate cases, waive any conceptual immunity, and
both authorize and direct cooperation. Presumably, should a tribunal not be
satisfied with the Secretary,General's cooperation, it could complain to the Se,
curity Council.
In the case of a military member of a force contingent provided by a UN mem,
ber State, the latter must evidently give its consent, whether or not the soldier is
one still in active service with the United Nations or has returned to his home
country. These States are under an obligation to cooperate with the tribunals
pursuant to their respective Statutes, which are binding on member States under
Charter Articles 25 and 48.1.88 Nevertheless, to the extent that a UN tribunal
requires information or testimony from such personnel that was acquired while
in UN service, the Secretary,General's authorization is also required.
Possible objections to full cooperation with a tribunal's demands can derive
from several considerations: safety of the potential witness (e.g., if s/he continues
to serve in an area controlled by associates of an accused); security and effective,
ness of the mission; and the confidentiality of the internal affairs of the United
Nations (e.g., the process by which an operational decision was reached).
In practice, the United Nations has allowed military and civilian personnel
to be interviewed by the prosecutor and/or by defense counsel and to testify be,
fore the tribunals. For example, General Dallaire, Commander of the UN Observer Mission Uganda,Rwanda (UNOMUR), who was a Canadian officer
seconded to the United Nations and thus served as a UN staff member, was
first permitted to be interviewed by representatives of both the prosecutor and
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of defense counsel for Jean~Paul Akayesu. Later, the Secretary~General autho~
rized him to testify before the Rwanda Tribunal on matters relevant to the
charges against Akayesu, but not on matters internal to the United Nations or
UNOMUR. In giving his testimony, the General was accompanied by a mem~
ber of the UN Office of Legal Affairs, who advised the Tribunal as to the mean~
ing of the restriction in the waiver.
Similar considerations apply to making available documents and files to the
tribunals, their prosecutor, and defense counsel. An additional consideration
in respect of requests for documents is that these must be reasonable in terms of
the quantity of files involved, especially if a request evidently amounts to a
"fishing expedition."
As to the arrest of persons indicted by a UN tribunal, any obligation of a UN
force to do so would depend in the first instance on its mandate (established by
the Security Council) and in practice on the realistic possibility of accomplish~
ing the task in light of, inter alia, the actual military resources available.
In due course, arrangements will have to be made with the International
Criminal Court for the provision of information and documents and for dealing
with requests for the release ofinformation made available in confidence by the
United Nations to a State and then requested from the latter by the Court. 89
Presumably such arrangements will reflect the UN's experience in respect of its
own tribunals.
Reflections and Proposals
The promulgation by the Secretary~General of his Bulletin on the obser~
vance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law would seem
to lay to rest any possible doubts as to both the obligation and the readiness of
these forces to comply with IHL in all appropriate situations, that is, when such
forces are actually engaged in combat.
The long reluctance of the organization to state so generally and unequivo~
cally, and any lingering national objections now that it has done so, probably re~
flect the still prevailing ambivalence about the deployment of such forces. This
ambivalence, in tum, reflects several considerations: concern for State sover~
eignty threatened by ever~increasing encroachments of international organiza~
tions; an essentially pacifist inclination that even in the face of major
provocations and great evils, the United Nations should perform its tasks
through diplomacy rather than military force; the somewhat mixed record of the
many operations hastily mounted in the early 1990s after the end of the Cold
War and the resulting doubts about the ability of international organizations to
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conduct military operations effectively; and finally, the mixed reactions some
States may have about any given operation, arising from historical alliances and
prejudices or genuinely different interests. In spite of this ambivalence, it should
be recognized that as the world community is at present constituted, there will be
occasions, whether many or few, when the use of collective military force will be
necessary-just as was foreseen half a century ago by the founders of the United
Nations. What is important is that such use of force always reflect the collective
will of the world community, and at present such collective will can be expressed
only through the competent organs of the United Nations.
What is equally important is that when military force is used by the world com,
munity, it should invariably be subject to the civilizing restraints of interna,
tional humanitarian law, as expressed in relevant customary international law
and especially as set out in numerous universal treaty instruments-including
those that were negotiated and adopted only recently by great majorities in in,
ternational fora, even if these have not yet been formally ratified by all States.
In other words, if and when the United Nations-always reluctantly-sallies
forth to do battle, it should only do so subject to all restraints that reflect the
most advanced humanitarian principles on which a large measure of-but not
necessarily universal-agreement has been reached. The Secretary,General's
Bulletin is well designed to help to ensure that this be so.
Although there can be no doubt that the Secretary, General had the author,
ity to promulgate the Bulletin, it would certainly acquire greater gravitas and
receive more respect from States and even from unofficial armed forces if it
were explicitly endorsed by the competent political organs, ideally by the Gen,
eral Assembly acting on a recommendation of the Security Council. Further,
more, the Council could and should provide that the fundamental principles
and rules set out in the Bulletin---or at least a general statement about the need
to observe IHL-should also apply to all military operations authorized by the
Council, whether as a delegated or franchised military operation under Charter
Article 42, or in self,defense under Article 51, or carried out by a regional orga,
nization under Article 53.1
Now that the extensive spadework to articulate a set of IHL principles and
rules has been accomplished, it is important to see to their full implementation.
In particular, the undertaking set out in Section 3 of the Bulletin, that the
members of all UN forces will be made fully acquainted with the principles and
rules of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of military person,
nel, should be carried out-which will evidently require the cooperation of ac,
tual and potential troop,contributing States. The result should be to raise the
standards by which these forces operate so as to leave no doubt that in all
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instances not only the letter but the spirit of international humanitarian law is
being scrupulously observed. Even in the sorry business of war, the United Na,
tions should establish the highest legal standard and set the best example.
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subject is also mentioned in many studies of UN peace-keeping operations, of which a very
complete bibliography was compiled by Michael Bothe, Peace-Keeping, in THE CHARTER OFTHE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 565-72 (Ed. Bruno Simma, 1994), as well as in other
sources cited in that study.
6. As explained below, this name derives from the blue headgear that is added to the
uniforms of members of national contingents when these become parts of a UN military force.
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responded in the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion (1962 I.e.J. REpORTS 151) that the
Assembly had the requisite authority.
8. Chapter VI of the Charter is titled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," and although
peace-keeping operations would seem to fall under that rubric, none of the specific articles in
that chapter (Articles 33-38) contain any provision that can plainly be held to authorize the
despatch of UN forces. On the other hand, Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," whose Article 42 does foresee such forces
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9. Thus, UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia was originally established as a Chapter VIYz
peace-keeping operation, but was a year later explicitly converted into a Chapter VII operation
after a number of French peace-keepers were killed in a Croatian attack on Serb-occupied areas
in the Kraina. See infra note 24.
10. It has, however, been argued that UN peace-making forces are not really established
under Article 42, because in the absence of any Article 43 agreements under which UN members
are to make available forces that can be called upon by the Council, all operations so far have had
to rely on the entirely voluntary contribution of military units by a limited number of members.
This can be countered by pointing out that under Article 48.1 all member States are obliged to
comply with Chapter VII decisions of the Council, presumably including orders to provide
military forces; in this view, Article 43 agreements would only be a convenience in
implementing, but not a prerequisite for Article 42 operations.
11. This was particularly true of the Korean operation, which was authorized to use the UN
flag; Security Council Resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, para. 5.
12. See infra notes 85 and 86.
13. See this author's somewhat lengthier analysis of this question in ALLOCATION OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: PROCEEDINGS OF AN
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE KIEL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, March 23 to
25, 1994. 17, at 28-30 (Ed. Jost Delbriick, 1995).
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14. It is possible to characterize the ECOWAS/ECOMOG operations in Liberia [indirectly
endorsed by SC Presidential Statements of22 July 1991 (S122133) and 7 May 1992 (S/23886), et
seq.] and later in Sierra Leone [indirectly endorsed by SC Presidential Statements of 11 July and
6 August 1997 (S/PRST/1997/36 and 42), et seq.] as falling under this rubric.
15. In effect, all it has required are occasional reports; see for Korea, Security Council
Resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, para. 6; and, for Iraq, Security Council Resolution 678
(1990) of 29 November 1990, para. 4. See also paragraph 18 of SC Resolution 794 (1992) in
connection with the Somalia operation referred to infra note 36.
16. By virtue of Charter Article 100.1-2. However, Force Commanders seconded from major
powers have perhaps not always maintained the required distance from their national
authorities.
17. This principle is reaffirmed, in respect of violations ofIHL, by Section 4 of the SGB, supra
note 1.
18. As mentioned above, Charter Articles 43 and 45, under which member States are to hold
available and in case of need provide to the United Nations specially designated military units,
have never yet been implemented. Consequently, each national unit supplied to a UN force is
provided on an ad hoc basis, usually under a standard agreement between the UN and the
government concerned, and can be withdrawn by the government at any time (though normally
this is done only at the end of a prescribed rotation period, usually six months).
19. This is in effect reaffirmed by Section 2 of the SGB, supra note 1.
20. Actually, there is one minor exception: The force that protects the distribution of food to
civilians (mostly Kurds) in northern Iraq consists, for complex political reasons, of UN "Guards,"
i.e., of persons who normally either serve as UN-employed guards at some UN headquarters or
other office, but for the most part of persons specially and directly recruited by the UN for this
assignment; these are therefore UN staff.
21. Charter Article 101, which deals with the employment and organization of UN staft: is
not necessarily limited to civilians, though most likely only such type of staff was foreseen by the
drafters of the Charter. See also supra note 20.
22. See infra note 42 and the related text.
23. These distinctions and terms were largely established by Secretary-General Boutros
Bourros-Ghali's report on An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. N4 71277 -S/24111 (1992), paras. 20 et
seq., reproduced in AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 1995, UN Publication Sales No.E.95.I.15 (2nd
edition, 1995), at 45 et seq.
24. Thus, for example, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia,
was initially established as a Chapter VIVz peace-keeping force, principally to demilitarize and
protect the Serb-occupied areas of Croatia (thus creating the UN Protected Areas, or UN PAs);
soon thereafter it was directed to demilitarize and operate the Sarajevo airport in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and later also to escort humanitarian convoys (principally those of
UNHCR) in Bosnia, to occupy the Prevlaka peninsula in Croatia opposite the FRY naval base of
Kotor, and to deploy a small preventive force in Macedonia. Early in 1992, after Croatian attacks
against an UNPA, the Security Council, in extending the period of the UNPROFOR mandate,
did so under Chapter VII for the entire operation (though it later withdrew that designation from
the preventive force in Macedonia); other resolutions mandating expansions in respect of Bosnia
followed (such as the establishment of "safe areas"), and early in 1995 UNPROFOR was, at the
demand of Croatia, divided into three separate operations for the three countries in which it had
been functioning. See Chapter 24 of THE BLUE HELMETS, supra note 2.
25. See, however, the distinction as to Chapter VII operations ~eferred to below.
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26. It should be noted that in some of its judgements the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), after hearing months of testimony, was unable to come to a
unanimous verdict as to whether various phases of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina were
civil or international. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic alk/a "Dule" (ICTY case No. IT-94-1-A),
Part. VI.B of the 7 May 1997 Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber dismissing those counts of
the indictment that related to war crimes on the ground that the Bosnian conflict was not an
international one, and the Dissent on that point by the Presiding Judge (later President)
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald [36 ILM 908 (1997), respectively at 924 and at 970]; reversed by the
15 July 1999 Judgment of the Appeals Chamber [38 ILM 1518 (1999)], paras. 146-162).
27. This, in effect, is the criterion that had been specified by Article 2 of the Institute for
International Law's Zagreb Resolution, quoted infra, text by note 42, and, more importantly, is
the criterion now set out in para. 1.1 of the SGB, supra note 1.
28.75 UNTS 287, 6 UST 3516, TIAS 3365, 50 AJIL 724 (1956).
29. See Legal Opinion issued by the UN Office of Legal Affairs to the Under-Secretary- General
for Special Political Affairs on 15 June 1972, 1972 UN JURIDICAL YEARBOOK 153. That opinion
cites the position taken by the United Nations at the second (1972) session of the
ICRC·convened Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict (a survey of the Conference
appears in UN Doc. N8781, and para. 218 refers to this issue)-a precursor to the 1974-1977
Diplomatic Conference at which the two 1977 Protocols were negotiated.
30. See in particular the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations and between International Organizations, UN Doc. NCONF.129/15
(not yet in force), which not only codifies the law concerning the participation of IGOs in
international treaties but also foresees, in its final clauses, the participation of the United
Nations and of certain other organizations in that Convention.
31. It might be pointed out that with the establishment ofits two war crimes tribunals and the
provisions therein for the imprisonment, in the custody of volunteer member States, of those
convicted by these courts, the United Nations has recently in effect demonstrated that it has
ways of overcoming some of these obstacles.
32. See infra text by notes 49, 55 and 56.
33. See, in particular, the discussions by Shraga, Meron and Condorelli in the CondoreIli
Colloque, supra note 5.
34. See Chapter 29 of THE BLUE HELMETS. supra note 2.
35. ld., Chapter 11.
36. ld., Chapter 14.
37. ld., Chapter 25.B.
38. S/RES/1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, especially paras. 9 and 10.
39. S/RES/1272 (1999) of25 October 1999, para. 1.
40. Resolution adopted in Vienna in 1965 and reproduced in HANDBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT (13th ed., 1994) 748.
41. See Report of the Fifty-Second [ILA] Conference held at Helsinki (14-20 August 1966),
Resolution IV (ii) on "International Medical Law: Application of the Geneva and certain other
ConventiOns, etc.," at xiv-xv.
42. 54:II ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 449 (authentic French),
465 (English translation); 66 AJIL 465 (1972); with commentary, in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF \XlAR 371 (Eds. Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, 1982) (a volume that contains the
texts of almost all the IHL texts cited in this study; this text has, however, been omitted from the
Third Edition (2000).).
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43. See infra note 81, Article 2.2.
44. See the brief discussion of this point by Thiebaut Flory, in section III of his study of
Charter Article 103 in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR
ARTICLE 1387-1388 (Eds. Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, 1985). This question is examined with
special reference to IHL by Christian Dominice in the Condorelli Colloque (supra note 5) at 175,
who concludes that even the Security Council could not overrule jus cogens principles of IHL.
45. Under Article 66 (a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1155 UNTS
331), such a determination should normally be made by the International Court of Justice; the
Court has never yet had occasion to do so, with respect to IHL or any other provision of
international law.
46. The question has, however, been raised in connection with economic sanctions imposed
by the Security Council under Charter Article 41, especially in respect of Iraq. See this author's
discussion of this question in The Law of Economic Sanctions, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM. 71 International Law Studies 473-474 (Eds. Michael Schmitt &
Leslie Green, Naval War College, 1998). This point was also briefly mentioned by Dominice at
the end of the study referred to in note 44 supra.
47. UN Doc. ST/SGB/UNEF/l of 20 February 1957, Article 44.
48. UN Doc. ST/SGB/ONUC/l of 15 July 1963, Article 43.
49. UN Doc. ST/SGB/UNFICYP/l of25 April 1964, Article 40, reproduced in 492 UNTS
57, at 148.
50. It should be noted that neither here, nor in any of the other regulations and agreements
referred to in this section of the present study, does the UN explicitly refer to any of the 1907
Hague Conventions, such as Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs of\XTar on Land
[205 CTS 227, 1 Bevans 631, TS 539,2 AJIL 90 (1908)], even though the ICRC appears to
consider that the 1949 Geneva Convention IV is merely supplementary to the earlier treaties;
see both the Preface and the Foreword to INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(Eds. Waldemar A. Solf &J. Ashley Roach, ICRC, 1987). On the other hand, as appears from
Appendix II hereto, the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV appear to be sources for
at least some of the provisions of the SGB, supra note 1.
51. The reference to the 1954 UNESCO Convention presumably responds to a resolution
adopted by the 1954 Hague Intergovernmental Conference recommending that the UN ensure
the application of the Convention by UN forces involved in military actions; see DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR. supra note 42, at 722 (Third Edition). Although no reference is made to
the contemporaneously adopted [First] Protocol to the Convention, it might be considered as
included in the UN's undertakings, as the citation to the UN TREATY SERIES is to the cover page
that refers to the Final Act of the Hague Conference, as well as to both the Convention and the
Protocol; evidently, no thought could then be given to the Second Protocol, adopted on 26
March 1999 [38 ILM 769 (1999)].
52.555 UNTS 119, at 126, para. 11.
53. See supra note 1.
54. UN Doc. N45/594 of 9 October 1990.
55. See, e.g., the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the
Republic of Rwanda on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) of5 November 1993 (1748 UNTS, Reg. No. 1-30482), and the Agreement between
the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the Status of the United
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO-the successor, in Croatia, of
UNPROFOR) of15 May 1995 (1864 UNTS, Reg. No. 1-31771).
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56. UN Doc. N46/185 of23 May 1991, para 28. It should be noted that in recent agreements
the word "spirit" in the second and last lines of the quoted text has been replaced by "rules."
57. These agreements are to be distinguished from the Contribution Agreements between
the United Nations and States Contributing Resources to United Nations Peace-keeping
Operations-a model of which is set out in UN Doc. N50/995 (1996), Annex-which are
routinely concluded.
58. NC.4/53/SR. 13, para. 21, and Press Release SG/SM/6777 - PK0179 of29 October 1998.
The General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations later complained that
it had not been consulted as to this new policy (N54/87 of 23 June 1999, para. 56).
59. S/RES/1261 (1999) of 25 August, 1999, para. 19. This requirement for training echoes
the undertaking in Section 3 of the SGB (supra note l)that the UN is to "ensure that members of
the military personnel of [UN forces] are fully acquainted with the principles and rules of the
[general conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel]."
60. UN Doc. N50/230 of 22 June 1995, para. 73.
61. Report by the ICRC on the first Meeting of Experts on the Applicability ofIntemational
Humanitarian Law to United Nations Forces, Geneva, 6-8 March 1995 Ouly 1995).
62. 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of \Y/ar, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 grammes Weight, 138 CTS 297 (Fr.); 1 AJIL Supplement 95 (1907),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 42, at 53 (Third Edition).
63. Most recently the Committee did so in its report on its meetings during 1999, N54/87 of
23 June 1999, para. 82.
64. See supra note 1.
65. See infra note 81.
66. See supra, text following note 55.
67. See supra, text by note 17.
68. UN CHARTER, Article 97.
69. See supra note 60.
70. See supra note 63. The lack of consultations was deplored by numerous delegations in the
debate on peacekeeping operations in the Fourth Committee at the 54th session of the General
Assembly during October 1999 (NC.4/54/SR.1O-13), though only the Canadian representative
faulted the Bulletin substantively, as containing "an unacceptable level of imprecision and
ambiguity" (id.,/SR.ll, para 2). It should be noted that the resolution that the General Assembly
adopted consequent on this debate (NRES/54/181 of 6 December 1999) does not refer to the
Bulletin at all, thus neither criticizing the insufficient consultations nor endorsing the substance.
The Special Committee is likely to add its own complaint on this score at its spring 2000
sessions-see supra note 58.
71. This would appear to follow from Article 98 of the UN Charter, and from the fact that,
even if the Secretary-General's position as de facto Commander-in-Chief is not specified in the
Charter, it follows from the circumstance that in establishing each military operation, the
Councilor the Assembly has specifically designated him as the one to implement it.
72. Introductory paragraph of the SGB, supra note 1.
73. Indeed, in a letter that the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council on 29 November 1992, in connection with a proposal to authorize an enforcement
operation in Somalia to be undertaken by a group of member States, he suggested that one way
by which the Council might exercise control over such a force would be to stipulate in the
authorizing resolution that the "operation be conducted with full respect for the applicable rules
of humanitarian law" (UN Doc. S/24868, at 5). However, the Council in authorizing the
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operation [by Resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992] did not include such a provision. See
Chapter 14.B-C of THE BLUE HELMETS. supra note 2.
74. Article 20(a) of the Convention, infra note 81; see also Article 2.2 relating to the scope of
coverage of the Convention.
75. See infra note 79.
76. UN Doc. CC\Xl/CONF.I/16 (Part 1),35 ILM 1218 (1996).
77. See, e.g., Article 63 of Geneva Convention IV, supra note 28.
78. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices (Protocol II) to the Inhumane \Xleapons Convention, infra note 79, 1342 UNTS 168, 19
ILM 1529 (1980).
79. Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
\Veapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
1342 UNTS 137, 19 ILM 1523 (1980). It should be noted that the denunciation clause of the
Convention (Article 9.2) contains a provision preventing the denunciation of a protocol from
taking effect while a UN force protected by that protocol is continuing to perform its functions in
the denouncing State.
80. UN Doc. CC\Xl/CONF.I/16 (Part I), 35 ILM 1206 (1996).
81. General Assembly Resolution 49159 of 9 December 1994, Annex, UNTS Reg. No.
1-35457,34 ILM 482 (1995). The Convention entered into force on 15 January 1999.
82. UN Doc. NCONF.183/9 (1998),37 ILM 998 (1998); a version of the Statute including
the numerous corrections that had been circulated by the depositary on a non-objection basis
has been issued by the ICC Preparatory Commission as document PCNICC/1999/INF.3. The
Statute is not yet in force.
83. Id., respectively Articles 8.2 (b) (iii) and 8.2(e) (iii).
84. See, e.g., Meron in the Condorelli Colloque (supra note 5) at 444.
85. UN Doc. S/25704 of 3 May 1993, Annex, 32 ILM 1163 (1993), approved by Security
Council Resolution 827 (1993) of25 May 1993, 32 ILM 1203 (1993).
86. Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, Annex, 33 ILM 1600
(1994).
87.1 UNTS 15, 21 UST 1418, TIAS 6900, Section 20 in respect of "officials" and Section 23
in respect of "experts on mission for the United Nations."
88: See Article 29 of the Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal (ICTY) (supra note 85) and Article
28 of the Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR) (supra note 86).
89. See respectively Articles 87.6 and 73 of the ICC Statute, supra note 82.
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United Nations

Appendbc.
ST/SGB/1999/I3

Secretariat

6 August 1999

Secretary-General's Bulletin
Observance by United Nations forces ofinternational humanitarian law
The Secretary-General, for the purpose of setting out fundamental principles and rules
of international humanitarian law applicable to
United Nations forces conducting operations under
United Nations command and control, promulgates
the following:

Nations undertakes to ensure that the force shall conduct its operations with full respect for the principles
and rules ofthe general conventions applicable to the
conduct of military personnel. The United Nations
also undertakes to ensure that members of the military personnel ofthe force are fully acquainted with
the principles and rules of those international instruments. The obligation to respect the said principles
and rules is applicable to United Nations forces even
in the absence of a status-of-forces agreement.

Section 1
Field of application
1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present
Section 4
bulletin arc applicable to Unitcd Nations forces
Violations of international humanitarian law
when in situations of armed conflict they arc activcly
In ease of violations ofinternational humanitarengaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for
the duration of their engagcment. They arc accord- ian law, members of the military personnel of a
ingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peace- United Nations force are subject to prosecution in
keeping operations when the use of force is their national courts.
permitted in self-defcnce.
1.2 The promulgation of this bulletin docs not afSection 5
fect the protected status of members of peacekeeping
Protection of the civilian population
operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety
5.1 The United Nations force shall make a clear
of United Nations and Associated Personncl or their distinction at all times between eivilians and comstatus as non-combatants, as long as they are entitled batants and between civilian objects and military obto the protection given to civilians under the interna- jectives. Military operations shall be directed only
tionallaw of armed conflict.
against combatants and military objectives. Attacks
on eivilians or civilian objects are prohibited.
Section 2
5.2 Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded
Application of national law
by this section, unless and for such time as they take
The present provisions do not constitute an ex- a direct part in hostilities.
haustive list of principles and rules of international
5.3 The United Nations force shall take all feasihumanitarian law binding upon military personnel, ble precautions to avoid, and in any event to miniand do not prejudice the application thcreof, nor do mize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
they replace the national laws by which military per- civilians or damage to civilian property.
•
sonnel remain bound throughout the operation.
5.4 In its area of operation, the United Nations
force shall avoid, to the extent feasible, locating milSection 3
itary objectives within or ncar densely populated arStatus-of-forces agreement
eas, and take all necessary precautions to protect the
In the status-of-forees agreement concluded be- civilian population, individual civilians and civilian
tween the United Nations and a State in whose terri- objects against the dangers resulting from military
tory a United Nations force is dcployed, the United operations. Military installations and equipment of
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peacekeeping operations, as such, shall not be considered military objectives.
5.5 The United Nations force is prohibited from
launching operations of a nature likcly to strikc military objcctives and civilians in an indiscriminate
manner, as wcll as operations that may bc cxpectcd
to cause incidental loss of life among the civilian
popUlation or damage to civilian objccts that would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.
5.6 The United Nations force shall not engage in
reprisals against civilians or civilian objects.
Section 6
Means and methods of combat
6.1 The right of the United Nations force to
choose methods and means of combat is not
)mlimited.
6.2 The United Nations force shall respect the
rules prohibiting or restricting the usc of certain
weapons and methods of combat under the relevant
instruments of international humanitarian law.
These include, in particular, the prohibition on the
usc of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and biological methods of warfare; bullcts which explode,
expand or flatten easily in the human body; and certain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conventional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments,
anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary
weapons, is prohibited.
6.3 The United Nations force is prohibited from
employing methods of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which
are intended, or may be expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment.
6.4 The United Nations force is prohibited from
using weapons or methods of combat of a nature to
cause unnecessary suffering.
6.5 It is forbidden to order that there shall be no
survivors
6.6 The United Nations force is prohibited from
attacking monuments of art, architecture or history,
archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship
and museums and libraries which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of operation, the United Nations force shall not usc such
cultural property or their immediate surroundings
for purposes which might expose them to destruction
or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and any
act of vandalism directed against cultural property is
strictly prohibited.
6.7 The United Nations force is prohibited from
attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless

objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and
drinking-water installations and supplies.
6.8 The United Nations force shall not make installations containing dangerous forces, namely
dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, the object of military operations if such opcrations may cause thc release of dangerous forces and
consequent severe losses among the civilian
population.
6.9 The United Nations force shall not engage in
reprisals against objects and installations protected
under this section.
Section 7
Treatment of civilians and persons liars de
combat
7.1 Persons not, or no longer, taking part in military operations, ineluding civilians, members of
armed forces who have laid down their weapons and
persons placed bars de combat by reason of sickness, wounds or detention, shall, in all circumstances, be treated humanely and without any
adverse distinction based on race, sex, religious convictions or any other ground. They shall be accorded
full respect for their person, honour and religious
and other convictions.
7.2 The following acts against any ofthe persons
mentioned in section 7.1 arc prohibited at any time
and in any place: violence to life or physical integrity; murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
reprisals; the taking of hostages; rape; enforced prostitution; any form of sexual assault and humiliation
and degrading treatment; enslavement; and pillage.
7.3 Women shall be especially protected against
any attack, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any other form of indecent assault.
7.4 Children shall be the object of special respect
and shall be protected against any form of indecent
assault.
Section 8
Treatment of detained persons
The United Nations force shall treat with humanity and respect for their dignity detained members of
the armed forces and other persons who no longer
take part in military operations by reason of detention. Without prejudice to their legal status, they
shall be treated in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, as
may be applicable to them mlltatis nllltandis. In
particular:
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Thcse shall at all times be respected and protected,
unlcss they are used, outside their humanitarian
functions, to attack or othcrwise commit harmful
acts against the United Nations force.
9.4 The United Nations force shall in all circumstances respect and protect medical personnel exclusivcly engaged in the search for, transport or
treatment ofthe wounded or sick, as well as religious
pcrsonnel.
9.5 The United Nations force shall respect and
protcct transports of wounded and sick or medical
equipment in the same way as mobile medical units.
9.6 The United Nations force shall not engage in
reprisals against the wounded, the sick or the personnel, establishments and equipment protected under
this section.
9.7 The United Nations force shall in all circumstanccs respect the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. These emblems may not be employed except
to indicate or to protect mcdical units and medical
establishments, personnel and material. Any misuse
of the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblems is
prohibited.
9.S The United Nations force shall respeet the
right of the families to know about the fate of their
sick, wounded and deceased relatives. To this end,
the force shall facilitate the work of the ICRC CenSection 9
tral Tracing Agency.
Protection of the wounded, the sick, and med9.9 The United Nations force shall facilitate the
ical and relief personnel
work of relief operations which are humanitarian
9.1 Members of the armed forces and other per- and impartial in character and conducted without
sons in the power of the United Nations force who any adverse distinction, and shall respect personnel,
are wounded or sick shall be respected and protected vchicles and premises involved in such operations.
in all circumstances. They shall be treated humanely
and rcceive the medical care and attention required
Section 10
by their condition, without adverse distinction. Only
Entry into force
urgcnt medical reasons will authorize priority in the
The present bulletin shall enter into force on 12
order of treatment to be administered.
August 1999.
9.2 Whenever circumstances permit, a suspension of fire shall be arranged, or other local arrange(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
mcnts made, to permit the search for and
Secretary-General
identification of the wounded, the sick and the dead
left on the battlefield and allow for their collection,
removal, exchange and transport.
.
9.3 The United Nations force shall not attack
medical establishments or mobile medical units.

(a) Their eapture and detention shall be notified
without delay to the party on whieh they depend and
to the Central Tracing Agency of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC), in particular in
order to inform their families;
(b) They shall be held in secure and safe premises which provide all possible safeguards of hygiene and health, and shall not be detained in areas
exposed to the dangers of the combat zone;
(e) They shall be entitled to receive food and
clothing, hygiene and medical attention;
(d) They shall under no circumstances be subjected to any form of torture or ill-treatment;
(e) Women whose liberty has been restricted
shall be held in quarters separated from men's quarters, and shall be under the immediate supervision of
women;
(f) In cases where children who have not attained
the age ofsixteen years take a direct part in hostilities
and arc arrested, detained or intemed by the Unitcd
Nations force, they shall continue to benefit from
special protection. In particular, they shall be held in
quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except
when aecommodated with their families;
(g) ICRC's right to visit prisoners and detained
persons shall be respected and guaranteed.
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Appendix"
SOURCES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECRETARY~GENERAL'S BULLETIN IN
IHL CONVENTIONS

Bulletin Paragraph lliL Convention Provisions
5.1

P-I: A 48, (51)

5.2

P-I: A 51.3

5.3

P-I: A 57.2 (a) (ii)

5.4

P-I: A 58(b), (c)

5.5

P-I: A 51.4 (end), .5(b), 57.2 (iii)

5.6

P-I: A 51.6, 52.1

6.1

P-I: A 35.1;

6.2

(1868 St. Petersb. Decl.; 1899 Hague Deels. 2, 3; 1925 Geneva
Protocol; Inhumane Weapons Conv., Protocols I-III; Chemical
Weapons Conv.; Oslo/Ottawa Landmines Conv.)

6.3

P-I: A 35.2, .3 (55)

6.4

P-I: A 35.2; (1968 St. Petersb. Decl.; H-IVR:A 23 (e»

6.5

P-I: A 40; P-II: A 4.1 (H-IVR: A 23 (d»

6.6

(H-IVR: A 27; H-IX A. 5; 1954 Hague Cony. Cult. Prop. P-I: A
53 (a); P-II: A 16)

6.7

P-I: A 54.2

6.8

P-I: A56.1

6.9

P-I: A 53 (c), 54.4, 56.4

7.1

G-I/IV: A 3(1); P-I: A 75.1; (P-II: A 4.1)

7.2

G-I/IV: A 3(1); P-I: A 75.2; (P-II: A 4.2)

7.3

P-I: A 76.1; G-IV: A 27

7.4

P-I: A 77.1

8 (a)

(G-III: A 69, 70)

8 (b)

(G-III: A 22, 19)

(H~IVR:

A 22)
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8 (c)

(O-III: A 26-30)

8 (d)

(O-III: A 13,17 (4),87(3); ICCPR: A 7; Torture Conv.: A 2)

8 (e)

(O-III: A 25 (4), 108 (2); O-IV: 76(4),85(4),124(3»

8 (f)

(O-IV: A 76 (5); P-I: A 77.3-4)

8 (g)

(O-III: A 126(4»

9.1

0-1: A 12 (1)-(3)

9.2

0-1: A 15 (3)

9.3

0-1: A 19 (1): P-I: A 12.1

9.4

0-1: A24

9.5

0-1: A35

9.6

0-1: A46

9.7

P-I: A38.1

9.8

P-I: A 32,33.3 (0-1: A 16(3); O-III: A 122 (2); O-IV: A 140 (2»

9.9

(P-I: A 81.1-4)

Notations
A

Article

O-IIlV

1949 Oeneva Conventions I, II, III or IV.

H-IVR

Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land

H-IX

1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Naval Bombardment in
Time of War

ICCPR

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

P-I/II

1977 Protocol I or II to the 1949 Oeneva Conventions

Items in the second column of the table that are not enclosed in parentheses
are ones that are fully or in part paraphrased in at least part of the indicated
paragraph of the Bulletin; items enclosed within parentheses are not directly
paraphrased, and may have merely been sources of inspiration of the indicated
paragraph of the Bulletin.
The texts of the IHL instruments referred to in the above table can be found,
inter alia, in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 42.
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